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CASE COMMENTS
ANTITRUST-" PACKAGING INDUSTRY" NOT A RELEVANT MAR-
KET UNDER CIAYTON ACT SECTION 7 FOR EVALUATING MERGER OF
TIN CONTAINER AND GLAss BOTTLE PRODUCERS
Continental Can Co., the nation's second largest producer of tin con-
tainers, acquired Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., the third largest manufacturer of
glass bottles.' The Department of Justice sought divestiture
2 under
amended section 7 of the Clayton Act,3 contending that the merger would
substantially lessen competition in ten "lines of commerce,"
4 including
"the packaging industry." 5 The district court granted defendants' motion
for dismissal on the merits, holding that the evidence did not establish a
reasonable probability of anticompetitive effect in any relevant line of
' Continental's total annual premerger sales (1955), including 33% of the tin
cans purchased in the United States, were $666,000,000. Instant case at 770. The
tin can industry has long been a duopoly. 2 WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLIciEs: AMERI-
CAN ExPERIENCE IN TWENTY INDUSTRIES 201-02 (1958). In 1955, American Can
and Continental together had 71% of total tin container sales. Instant case at 773.
Even prior to the merger, Continental was a diversified packaging company: 77%
of its sales were in metal cans, 11% in paper and fiber containers, 3.5% in bottle
tops and cork products, and most of the rest in defense work. Continental Can Co.,
Annual Report (1952), in 2 WHITNEY, op. cit. supra at 222.
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. had premerger sales of $79,000,000, accounting for approxi-
mately 9.6% of the domestic glass container market in 1955. Instant case at 775.
2 The Federal Trade Commission shares responsibility for enforcement of the
Clayton Act with the Justice Department. The Attorney General is authorized to
bring proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain violations of the act. 38 Stat.
736 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (Supp. IV, 1963). Alternately, after hear-
ings and upon an examiner's finding of a Clayton Act violation, the FTC may order
the respondent to cease and desist from the violation and to divest itself of stock
or other assets held contrary to § 7. 38 Stat 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21
(1958). See ATrr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 374 (1955).
3 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958) :
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.
(1950) amendments in italics.) The present text strengthens the original 1914
language which applied only to stock, not to asset, acquisitions. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L
COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 115-16 (1955).
4 The Senate Judiciary Committee in its report on amended § 7 had equated the
terms "line of commerce," "relevant market," and "orbit of competition," finding their
connotations identical and concluding that a line of commerce is to be determined by
evaluating the defendant's products in their competitive capacities. S. REP. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1950); cf. Bocx, MERGERS AND MARxETs 27 (1961);
MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON AcT 259 (1959).
5 Other lines of commerce proposed by the Government were: 1-Containers
for the canning industry. 2-Containers for the beer industry. 3-Containers for
the soft drink industry. 4-Containers for the toiletries and cosmetics industry.
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commerce. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761
(S.D.N.Y.), prob. juris. noted, 375 U.S. 893 (1963) (No. 367).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act forbids corporate mergers "where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
Acquisitions with substantial anticompetitive potential are thus proscribed
in their incipiency.6 The Government must establish, however, that in a
specific line of commerce, whether a "product market" 7 or a "well-defined
submarket," 8 an anticompetitive effect is reasonably probable. 9 Deter-
mination of the relevant lines of commerce constitutes a vital element in
assessing merger legality. Where combining firms control only small
portions of a total industry but compete in certain specific commodities, the
Government has attempted to invalidate mergers by narrowly defining as a
line of commerce the particular products in which the companies had com-
peted prior to consolidation.10 Where merging firms control large shares
of a product market, the Government has sought to extend the relevant
area in which to evaluate anticompetitive effect." The language of sec-
5-Containers for the medicine and health industry. 6-Containers for the household
and chemical industry. 7-The can industry. 8-The glass container industry.
9-Metal closures. Instant case at 778 n.34. On appeal, the Government has limited
itself to argument on the "food-container" market, similar in its interindustry effect
to the "packaging industry" but refined by end-product limitation to food-packaging.
Jurisdictional Statement for the United States, p. 14, United States v. Continental
Can Co., prob. juris. noted, 375 U.S. 893 (1963) (No. 367).
6 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962) ; United States v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (du Pont-General Motors), 353 U.S. 586, 589
(1957).7 "Product market" a technical term, carries no suggestion of intraindustry
limitation, i.e. to one "product." Its connotation encompasses rather the "area of
effective competition," 370 U.S. at 324, or the "orbit of competition," S. REP. No.
1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1950). See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963) ; Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962) ; Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors,
206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953); United States v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
8 370 U.S. at 325. In Brown Shoe, relevant submarkets were men's, women's,
and children's shoes.
9Id. at 323.
10 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 937 (1962) (all trade coarse paper v. census coarse paper) ; United States
v. Bliss & Laughlin, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1962), remanded, 371 U.S. 70,
aff'd on rehearing, TP-ADE REa. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 170734 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27,
1963) (product market not limited to cold-finished steel bars). In the instant case
the Justice Department seeks to establish both broad and narrow markets.
1 Thus the Department of Justice, though contending in the instant case that
glass products are divisible into various container submarkets, argued against Owens-
Illinois Glass Co.'s attempt to divide its glass market, for Clayton Act purposes, into
various submarkets distinguished by different container materials. United States v.
Owens-Illinois Glass Co., TRAE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 170808 (N.D. Ohio,
June 7, 1963) (consent decree: manufacturer of glass containers required to divest
itself of acquired fiber box manufacturer as going concern). Landmark cases in
which the Government has sought wide product markets include Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (division of the retail shoe market into men's,
women's, and children's shoes); FTC v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 5 F.2d 615 (3d Cir.
1925), modified sub norn. FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926) (denial
of attempt to extend market from milk bottles to glass bottles and jars in general) ;
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (overall
ingot capacity, not various steel products, constituted relevant market.
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tion 7 makes possible this dual approach by forbidding any merger which
may substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce.
1 2 In general,
the courts properly have refrained from treating delineation of relevant lines
of commerce as separate from consideration of the particular merger's effect
on competition. 13 While differing criteria guide determination of lines
of commerce in the two categories-submarkets are delineated by "practical
indicia" 14 and the outer boundaries of overall product markets by "rea-
sonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between
the product itself and substitutes for it" 14-, substantial anticompetitive
effect in any line will nullify a merger. 16
In the present case, the court was unwilling to accept as a single line
of commerce a "packaging industry" delineated by competition between tin,
glass, and other container producers. The court acknowledged the sub-
stantial interindustry competition between glass and tin containers,'
17 yet
12 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
13 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 372 U.S. 321, 356 (1963);
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
937 (1962) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 12, at 326.
At times some decisions appear to speak of this product market determination
as "precedent" to consideration of the anticompetitive effect of the merger. United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (du Pont-General Motors), 353 U.S.
586, 593 (1957). Similar language appears in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
supra note 12, at 328, 335. But the Court's decision in Brown Shoe corresponds rather
to this edict: "[T]he boundaries of the relevant market must be drawn with sufficient
breadth to include the competing products of each of the merging companies and to
recognize competition where, in fact, competition exists." Id. at 326. Such a result
is attainable only where the relevant market itself is drawn by competitive effects.
Accordingly the inquiries as to market and as to competitive effect cannot be made
separately. Barnes, The Primacy of Competition and the Brown Shoe Decision, 51
GEo. L.J. 706, 726-30 (1963); Rahl, Current Antitrust Developments in the Merger
Field, 8 ANTrrRuST BULL. 493, 504 (1963). The competitive effect locates the line
of commerce. The substantiality of the anticompetitive effect can then be tested.
14 Such indicia may include the industry's or the public's recognition of the sub-
market as an independent economic entity; a product's peculiar characteristics and
uses; its utilization of unique production facilities or specialized vendors, distinct
customers, or prices; and sensitivity to price change. By insisting on utilization of
these varying criteria where each is appropriate, the Court in Brown Shoe reduced
the confusion which had resulted from the diversity of standards previously enunciated
by the courts. Cf. Lewyn & Mann, Ten Years Under the New Section 7 of the
Clayton Act: A Lawyer's Practical Approach to the Case Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. RF.v.
1067, 1070 (1961). Thus, e.g., the standard of "peculiar characteristics" expressed
in du Pont-General Motors is considered by the Court in Brown Shoe only another
criterion for determination of a submarket, not an overruling of the broad "reasonable
interchangeability" standard for determination of an overall market. 370 U.S. at 325.
'5Ibid. For the economist, elasticity of demand is a tool for determining the
competitive relation between products. Cross-elasticity of demand is indicated by
the extent to which a price reduction in one product will decrease sales of another.
Where there is a high positive cross-elasticity of demand, a high degree of substi-
tution between the products is indicated. See BAIN, PRICE THEORY 52 (1952);
STIGLER, THEORY OF PRICES 88-90 (1946).
16United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (din Pont-General Motors),
353 U.S. 586, 593-95 (1957); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325
(1962).
17 Instant case at 780-81. During the 1930's tin largely replaced glass as a beer
container; more recently, tin cans have invaded the carbonated beverage field with
less success. WHITNEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 222. During the Second World
War the great growth of the glass container industry resulted in large measure
from curtailment of the tin plate supply. Instant case at 775. The tin can companies,
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concluded that a relevant product market could not be established through
the demonstration of such interindustry competition.1 8 Neither past anti-
trust decisions nor the text of section 7 appear to necessitate this result.
While the court's holding was no doubt partially based on an absence of
evidence as to the nature of the "packaging industry," 19 the court cited
in support of its decision United States v. E. L DuPont de Nemours & Co.
(Cellophane Case),2 0 which was decided under the Sherman Act. There
the Supreme Court stated that the relevant market under the Sherman Act
could not include widespread interindustry competition, as between brick
and steel, or wood, cement, or stone.2 1 Despite this dictum the Court
proceeded to hold that DuPont had not violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act by its control of almost 75 percent of United States cellophane pro-
duction, designating the relevant market as "flexible packaging materials,"
including glassine, waxing paper, sulphite bags, aluminum foil, cellulose
acetate, pliofilm, polyethylene, Saran and Cry-o-Rap,2 in which market
DuPont's share was approximately 20 percent. Thus, the Court encom-
passed within a single relevant line of commerce interindustry competition
between cellophane and functionally related alternatives.
However, even if there were previous Sherman Act holdings expressly
rejecting wide interindustry competition as a guide to determining relevant
product markets, they should not be controlling in Clayton Act litigation.
While section 2 of the Sherman Act is aimed at monopolies, the Clayton
Act is concerned with anticompetitive mergers; therefore, opposite results
may flow from identical judicial treatment of interindustry competition
under the two acts. Since a high degree of actual concentration is required
for violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, courts cannot recognize sub-
stitute products from other industries as part of the relevant market without
tending to excuse even absolute monopolies of one industry.23 On the other
however, have defended their packaging market by continual entry into competing
fields, although "there is no evidence yet" of any reduction in their efforts at improving
and marketing tin cans since their entry into the paper and fiber fields. WHITNEY,
op. cit. mipra note 1, at 222-23.
18 "[T]he Act deals specifically with relevant product markets and the lessening
of competition within them. The fact that there is interindustry or interproduct
competition between metal, glass and plastic containers is not determinative of the
metes and bounds of a relevant product market." Instant case at 781. That the
court regarded the interindustry competition in the present case as not the kind of
competition meant to be protected by the proscription of horizontal mergers is em-
phasized by its characterization of the transaction as a "conglomerate" merger, which
is one "in which there is no discernible relationship in the nature of business between
the acquiring and acquired firms." H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1949).
19 See instant case at 788.
20 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
2 1 Id. at 393.
22 Id. at 405.
2 In the classic Alcoa case, Judge Hand refused to allow Aloca's 90% market
share to be diluted by competition of copper and steel; he admonished that inter-
industry competition could not determine the market under the Sherman Act. United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1945). The district
court had given some weight to interindustry competition. 44 F. Supp. 97, 165, 222-23
(S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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hand, since the Clayton Act is concerned with even incipient anticompetitive
effects,12 4 delineation of a line of commerce 25 to include products from more
than a single industry accords with its legislative purpose 26 by bringing
within the law's ambit mergers otherwise immune no matter what their
practical anticompetitive effect.
27
In fact, courts have interpreted identical language in several sections
within the Clayton Act differently, in accordance with the varying purposes
and possible effects of the provisions. For example, the "quantitative sub-
stantiality" test which governs application of section 3 of the Clayton Act,2
the provision aimed at exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, was not
accepted as determinative under section 7, although both are applicable
under the same criterion--"where the effect may be substantially to lessen
competition." Despite legislative history stating that the criteria of illegality
under amended section 7 "are intended to be similar to those which the
24 For differentiation of the Sherman Act monopoly level from the "incipiency"
level required for merger prohibition under the Clayton Act see ATr'y GEN. NAT'L
Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 124-25 (1955).
The 1950 amendments leave no doubt that "the tests for measuring the legality
of any particular economic arrangement under the Clayton Act are to be less stringent
than those used in applying the Sherman Act." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 328 (1962).
25 The Clayton Act itself nowhere defines the term "line of commerce." As to
specific definitions, its legislative history is "obscure, ambiguous and inconclusive."
Handler, Quantitative Substantiality and the Celler-Kefauver Act-A Look at the
Record, 7 McER L. REv. 279, 287 (1956) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra
note 24, at 320-21. See generally Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging
of Law and Economics, 74 Hxv. L. REv. 226 (1960) ; Note, Product Market Defini-
tion Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 861, 861-67 (1962).
2 6 Disturbed by a rising trend of industrial combination, Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, supra note 24, at 315; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168
F. Supp. 576, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), Congress sought "to cope with monopolistic
tendencies in their incipiency," S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950),
and "to limit future increases in the level of economic concentration resulting from
corporate mergers and acquisitions," id. at 3; cf. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1949). In reality, the "deleteriousness" of the postwar merger movement
now appears to have been somewhat exaggerated; there were very few mergers
between firms of large size. See Blair & Houghton, The Lintner-Butters Analysis
of the Effect of Mergers on Industrial Concentration, 1940-47, 33 REv. op Ecoxomics
& STATISTICs 63 (1951). See generally Bok, mipra note 25, at 228-33.
27 The possibility of the Government's utilizing different market boundaries
under the two acts was tangentially noticed by Mr. Justice Harlan in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, supra note 24, at 368 n.3 (separate opinion) : "If the Govern-
ment were permitted to choose its 'line of commerce' it could presumably draw the
market narrowly in a case that turns on the existence vel non of monopoly power
and draw it broadly when the question is whether both parties to a merger are within
the same competitive market."
28The test was enunciated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949). But cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 24, at 329-31; Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). As applied to mergers it
would focus attention in their evaluation on the market shares of the merging cor-
porations in the relevant line, other factors being pertinent only where the percentages
were below a predetermined level. For the "battle of words" on the application of
"quantitative" and "qualitative" substantiality to § 7 after Standard Oil see, e.g.,
Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition--The Impact of Standard Oil Co.
of California v. United States on the Standard of Legality Under the Clayton Act,
98 U. PA. L. REv. 10 (1949) ; Handler, Quantitative Substantiality and the Celler-
Kefauver Act-A Look at the Record, 7 MERcE. L. REv. 279 (1956); Levi, The
DuPont Case and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 3 ANTrrpUST BuLL. 3, 7 (1958).
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courts have applied in interpreting the same language as used in other Sec-
tions of the Clayton Act," 29 both the courts and the Federal Trade Com-
mission have concluded that "quantitative substantiality" is not the proper
test of competitive effect under section 730
In dealing with submarkets rather than overall product markets under
the Clayton Act, the courts have not operated under a single-industry
limitation in defining relevant lines of commerce. In the present case,
the court recognized as a relevant market the beer container industry en-
compassing containers made of tin and of glass.31 In United States v.
Bliss & Laughlin, Inc.,32 the relevant line of commerce included both steel
bars and cold drawn wire.3 There would appear to be no compelling
reason for accepting interindustry competition in determination of submarket
lines of commerce while excluding it when defining overall product markets.
Indeed, rather widely defined product markets have previously found
judicial acceptance in Clayton Act prosecutions: a "fuel energy" market
including electricity, fuel oil and natural gas; 4 a line of commerce includ-
ing both aluminum and copper wire and cables; 3 5 and a "commercial bank-
ing industry," including the variegated operations of modem financial
institutions. 6
However, the Government supplied little factual evidence on the al-
leged competitive effect of the merger on the putative packaging industry,
29 H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
30 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320-22 & n.38 (1962) ; RahI,
Current Antitrust Developments in the Merger Field, 8 ANTITRUST BiLL.. 493, 502
(1963); cf. Handler and Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-
Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 CoLum. L. Rxv. 629, 675 (1961). Even prior to Brown
the Commission had viewed a § 7 quantitative substantiality test as negativing its
own expertise. See Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953) ; Note, "Substantially
to lessen competition . . ." Current Problems of Horizontal Mergers, 68 YALE L.J.
1627, 1636 (1959). See generally McAllister, Where the Effect May Be To Snb-
stantially Lessen Competition or Tend To Create a Monopoly, in A.B.A. SECToN
OF ANTITRUST LAW, AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 209-33 (1958).
31The court found that glass and tin containers of beer shared end use, some
joint characteristics, a mutual sensitivity to competition, and at least some price
relationship. Instant case at 794. There was a "recognition in each industry of
virtual interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand between the two
types of containers used for this purpose." But even with "beer containers" established
as a relevant market, there was no Clayton Act violation, since Hazel-Atlas' share
in the overall beer container market thus delineated was only 'oo of 1% in 1955,
1%0o of 1% in 1957. Instant case at 795.
32202 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1962), remanded, 371 U.S. 70 (1963), aff'd on
rehearing, TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 70734 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1963).
31d. at 76149.
34 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.)
170571, at 77290, 77294 (D. Utah Nov. 20, 1962), prob. juris. noted, 373 U.S. 930
(1963) (No. 944).
35 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y.),
prob. iurs, noted, 375 U.S. 808 (1963) (No. 204). Although refusing to consider
aluminum wire and cable a line of commerce separate and distinct from copper wire
and cable, the district court found no probability of a substantial lessening of com-
petition in the acquisition of a copper wire and cable producer by a fully integrated
aluminum company producing aluminum wire and cable.
36United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 372 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). On the
variegated nature of the "commercial banking" business, see id. at 326 n.5.
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even failing to furnish data as to market shares or other structural analysis
of this "industry." 37  There was no evidence related to the various indicia
established by Brown Shoe Co. v. United States for determination of
relevant markets.3 8 Even if the court had been willing to recognize the
possible determination of a relevant overall product market by wide inter-
industry competition, a market as nebulous as the Government's proposed
packaging industry might still have impressed it as a "sort of Clayton Act
Wonderland." 39 While continuing to argue for an overall product market
delineated by interindustry competition between tin and glass products, on
appeal the Government is advancing not the packaging industry, but a
"food-container" market,40 in which tin and glass play a far larger role.
Regarding the paucity of economic data, the recent decision in United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank 41 suggests that there may have been
no evidential insufficiency in the Government's failure to provide quanti-
tative analysis of its proposed packaging industry. The Court there stated
that implementation of the Congressional anticoncentration intent "in cer-
tain cases" may warrant dispensing with "elaborate proof of market struc-
ture, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive effects," under the
Clayton ActA---that where a merger results in a single concern controlling
an undue share of the relevant market and in a significant increase of con-
centration in that market, the inference of lessened competition may be
drawn "in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not
likely" to cause such effects.3 If the Court is in fact intent upon relaxing
economic evidence requirements "in certain cases," such dispensation might
be peculiarly appropriate to Clayton Act litigation involving interindustry
competition. When available at all, market statistics are of limited aid in
interindustry cases; interchangeability of products and plants tends to make
present figures for production of particular goods far less significant than
total position in the interindustry market. When as large and diversified
a market as the purported packaging industry is involved, separate figures
37 The court sharply noted this failure, stating that "there was no evidence at
all about competition within this alleged market, let alone anticompetitive effects.
In sum, there was complete failure of proof." Instant case at 788.
38This absence seems to have influenced the court strongly in its rejection of
the "packaging industry" as a line of commerce. Instant case at 788. For the estab-
lishment of an overall product market (here the "packaging industry"), however,
the Brown Shoe standard is "reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-
elasticity of demand." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
Practical indicia are needed only for determination of particular submarkets. Ibid.
Compare note 11 supra.
39 Instant case at 788.
4o Jurisdictional Statement for the United States, p. 14, United States v. Conti-
nental Can Co., prob. juris. noted, 375 U.S. 893 (1963) (No. 367).
41374 U.S. 321 (1963).
42
1d. at 362-63.
43 Ibid.; United States v. Koppers Co., 202 F. Supp. 437 (W.D. Pa. 1962); cf.
United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
where the court refused a narrow economic analysis in favor of "an examination
into economic realities. All competitors must be considered including competition
faced by the product in question from other products."
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on respective shares in the total production of metal and glass containers
(21.9 percent and 3.1 percent respectively) may provide the best indication
of the competitive position of the merging firms.4 While the Clayton
Act's incipiency criterion of "reasonable probability" of diminished com-
petition 45 does not require economic data elaborate enough to establish
certainty of effect,46 such a change still presents some danger of attempted
application of the act on a purely speculative basis.
4 7
The evidentiary question, however, will not be reached in cases in-
volving interindustry competition unless the conceptual issue is first re-
solved in favor of wide interindustry competition as a possible determinant
of a line of commerce. Where competitive realities indicate otherwise,
the Clayton Act does not appear to justify a refusal to encompass firms in
interindustry competition within a single "relevant line of commerce."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ExPATRATION FOR WARTIME DRAFT
EVASION Is PUNISHMENT REQUIRING FIFTH AND SIXH AEND-
MENT SAFEGUARDS; EXPATRIATION FOR SERVICE IN FOREIGN A:RMED
FORCES Is REGuLATioN
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
statute providing for expatriation of an individual who departed from or
remained outside the country to avoid military service in time of war or
national emergency' because it imposed punishment without fifth and
sixth amendment criminal procedural safeguards, although on its face it
failed to express a penal intent. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144 (1963). In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit up-
held a statute lacking criminal procedural safeguards that provided for
expatriation upon serving in the armed forces of a foreign state,2 on the
44 Cf. Jurisdictional Statement for the United States, supra note 40, at 21.
45 The employment of the words "may b&' in § 7 refers only to "reasonable
probability. . . . A requirement of certainty and actuality of injury to competition
is incompatible with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act by reaching incipient
restraints." S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950) ; United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. (du Pont-General Motors), 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957);
instant case at 767.
4 6 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 341 n.68 (1962), cites with
approval Arr'y Gm. NATL Comm. ANTrrRUST REP. 126 (1955): "While sufficient
data to support a conclusion is required, sufficient data to give the enforcement agencies,
the courts and business certainty as to competitive consequences would nullify the
words 'Where the effect may be' in the Clayton Act and convert them into 'Where
the effect is." For the difficulties involved in the theory of quantitative substan-
tiality and its utilization of elaborate market proofs see Bok, supra note 25, at 249-58.
The author concludes that a "broad inquiry" along qualitative grounds is feasible.
Id. at 258.
47 Cf. United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 821-22 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
I Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(a) (10), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a) (10) (1958).
2 Immigration and Nationality Act §349(a) (3), 66 Stat 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a) (3) (1958).
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ground that it was regulatory rather than penal. United States ex rel.
Marks v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 810
(1963) (No. 253).
The first two expatriation statutes reviewed by the Supreme Court did
not express a penal or regulatory purpose and did not provide criminal
procedural safeguards. In Mackenzie v. Hare,3 the Court upheld a statute
providing that any American woman who marries a foreigner loses her
citizenship for the duration of the marriage,4 and, in Savorgnan v. United
States,5 it approved a statute providing for expatriation upon naturalization
in a foreign state.6 In each case the Court declared that the enactment
was within Congress' power to avoid international problems of dual al-
legiance; it did not consider whether the intent was to provide punishment
or regulation, or whether the procedural guarantees afforded the expatriate
were adequate. In Peres v. Brownell,7 the Court upheld in a similar man-
ner a statute imposing expatriation for voting in a foreign election.8
On the same day as it decided Perez, the Court, in Trop v. Dulles,9
reviewed a statute providing for expatriation upon conviction by court-
martial of wartime desertion from the armed forces.'0 Finding that the
purpose of the statute was clearly punitive," four justices of the majority
ruled that this exercise of congressional power was cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the eighth amendment.' 2  A four-justice dissent
asserted that the statute was within Congress' war power,'8 that there was
3 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
4 Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228.
5 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
6Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(a)(1), 66 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a) (1) (1958).
7 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
8 Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(a) (5), 66 Stat 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481 (a) (5) (1958). In Hare and Savorgnan the Court was not forced to
reach the additional constitutional problem of whether the fourteenth amendment
limits the congressional power of expatriation to consent situations, since in each
case the Court was willing to create a presumption of consent from the acts leading
to expatriation. Hare v. Mackenzie, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915); Savorgnan v.
United States, 338 U.S. 491, 499-502 (1950). In Perez, however, the Court was
squarely faced with the problem because of the unreality of a presumption that voting
in a foreign election indicates consent to expatriation. The majority declared that
the fourteenth amendment does not restrict "the power otherwise possessed by Con-
gress to withdraw citizenship." Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 n.3 (1958). In
effect, the decision sanctioned expatriation without the consent of the individual. See
generally Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American Nationality, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1510
(1960); Note, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164 (1955); 56 MicH.
L. REv. 1142, 1147 (1958) ; 12 VAD. L. Rxv. 866 (1959).
9 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
l Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(a) (8), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481 (a) (8) (1958). Again Congress did not express a penal or regulatory inten-
tion in the language of the statute.
11 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 93-99 (1958) (opinion of Warren, CJ.).
12 An alternative ground asserted for unconstitutionality of the statute was "that
citizenship is not subject to the general powers of the National Government and
therefore cannot be divested in the exercise of those powers" without voluntary
relinquishment or abandonment by the citizen. Id. at 92. This ground was contrary
to the Court's decision in Perez. See note 8 supra.
13 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 120-21 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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nothing on the face of the legislation or in its history to indicate that
Congress did not have a nonpenal purpose to regulate the military forces, 14
and "that Congress might reasonably have believed the morale and fighting
efficiency of our troops would be impaired if our soldiers knew that their
fellows who had abandoned them . . . were to remain in the communion
of our citizens." '5 Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in the conclusion of
unconstitutionality, on the ground that the statute was beyond Congress'
war power. He reasoned that the manifest severity of expatriation re-
quired limiting its use to a problem which could be remedied only by this
sanction, and ruled that expatriation of deserters could not be justified as
peculiarly appropriate to the war effort6 because it did not effectively
promote the morale and fighting efficiency of our troops1 7 and because
alternative means were available for this purpose.'
8
In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court found that the legislative history of
the statute imposing expatriation for wartime draft evasion clearly indicated
a penal intent ;19 thus, the absence of fifth and sixth amendment criminal
procedural protections was unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Brennan con-
curred,20 agreeing that the statute was punitive and reiterating the theory
he advanced in Trop, which decision he deemed controlling. The four
dissenters disputed the majority's reading of the legislative history, argu-
ing that the statute was a regulation within the war power of Congress
designed to solve a basic problem of wartime morale by assuring soldiers
and civilians that draft evaders living abroad would not be able to return
after the war to enjoy the fruits of victory.
In determining the constitutionality of expatriation statutes, the Court
in Trop and Mendoza-Martinez focused on whether the congressional pur-
pose was to punish or to regulate. If punishment was the purpose, the
statute may be invalidated for being cruel and unusual, as asserted in Trop,21
or for lacking adequate criminal guarantees as in Mendoza-Martinez; 22
.4 Id. at 125.
15 Id. at 122.
16 "Congress' asserted power to expatriate the deserter bears to the war powers
precisely the same relation as its power to expatriate the tax evader would bear to
the taxing power." Id. at 113 (opinion of Brennan, J.). He distinguished Perez,
reasoning that expatriation of one voting in a foreign election is a peculiarly necessary
solution under the foreign affairs power to solve a problem of dual allegiance.
17 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 111-13 (1958) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
18Id. at 114.
3
9 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 170-84 (1963).
20 justices Douglas and Black also concurred, contending that Congress has no
power to deprive a person of the citizenship by birth recognized in the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 186.
21A majority of the Court has never agreed that expatriation is cruel and
unusual punishment. Such agreement would render meaningless a reenactment with
proper criminal procedural protection of the statute held unconstitutional in Mendoza-
Martinez.
22 1n some circumstances a finding of punishment would also raise the issues of
double jeopardy, bill of attainder, or ex post facto law.
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if regulation was the purpose, the sixth and eighth amendments do not
apply and due process requirements are less stringent.2 3 While the primary
source of guidance in distinguishing between punishment and regulation
must be legislative history, the divergence of interpretation in both Trop
and Mendoza-Martinez indicates that it does not always provide a clear
answer. Thus, it is helpful to evolve general tests based on past judicial
distinctions developed in dealing with other sanctions.
In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court propounded seven tests which it
deemed relevant to the inquiry.2 One criterion suggested was whether
the specified sanction involved an affirmative disability or restraint. The
Court cited Ex parte Garland,25 the companion case of Cummings v.
Missouri,26 as illustrative. In these cases, a statute making an oath dis-
claiming support for the confederacy during the Civil War a prerequisite
to ordination to the priesthood, and a similar statutory requirement for
admission to the bar were declared unconstitutional as bills of attainder-
legislative inflictions of punishment on particular individuals without a
judicial trial =--and as ex post facto laws-retroactive inflictions of pun-
ishment. The Court also cited United States v. Lovett,28 which held a
statute prohibiting remuneration for public employment to three individuals
suspected of subversive activity to be an unconstitutional bill of attainder
and punishment without procedural safeguards. The effect of each of these
legislative acts was to impose a sanction of permanent disqualification from
the enjoyment of a privilege or occupation. The Court in each case labeled
the sanction "punishment" because of the affirmative disability or restraint
involved. However, imposition of this same sanction or disqualification
for failure to show allegiance,2 9 for prior criminal activity,30 and for other
reasons designed to protect the publics' has been deemed regulation of a
2 3 Due process requirements for a regulatory sanction include at least notice and
a hearing. See, e.g., Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 437 (1901).
24 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). The Court did not apply them because it found
that the legislative history clearly indicated a penal purpose.
25 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
2671 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
27 Note, 34 IND. L.J. 231, 236 (1959).
28328 U.S. 303 (1946).
29 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96 (1952) (deportation of aliens
for past Communist activity); American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 412-15 (1950) (imposition of restrictions on, and denial of benefits to, a labor
organization upon failure of the officers to file "non-Communist" affidavits); cf.
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961) (denial of an application to the
Bar upon the applicant's refusal to answer questions pertaining to membership in
the Communist party) ; Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 722-23 (1951)
(exclusion from public office for five years because of subversive activity).
So Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 38-39 (1924) (deportation of aliens); Hawker
v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (exclusion from the practice of medicine); EX
parte Wall., 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1892) (exclusion from the practice of law); cf.
DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (disqualification from holding office
in a waterfront labor organization until granted a subsequent pardon by the Board
of Parole).
3' See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Blaise D'Antoni &
Associates v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Pierce v. SEC, 239 F.2d 160, 163
(9th Cir. 1956).
CASE COMMENTS
number of privileges and occupations. A forced payment of money to the
Government 32 and a denial of a statutory benefit 33 are additional examples
of sanctions involving an affirmative disability or restraint held to be pun-
ishment in one case and regulation in another. Thus, attempting to classify
sanctions as punitive or regulatory by their intrinsic qualities is not
fruitful.34
A second criterion suggested in Mendoza-Martines was whether the
operation of the sanction would "promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence .. . ." 35 A prerequisite to imposing
punishment is nearly always that the wrongful conduct be voluntary,36
since only behavior which is the result of conscious choice can be deterred
by a sanction. There is no doubt, however, that the central object of regu-
lation is also to discourage the objectionable conduct,37 so that promotion
of deterrence is not a useful criterion.
The distinguishing feature of punishment is that it reflects in the law
society's moral judgment of blameworthiness.3 8 The remaining tests pro-
pounded in Mendoza-Martinez suggest four criteria that are useful in
distinguishing punishment from regulation because they indicate the pres-
ence or absence of an intent to fix blameworthiness in instances in which
Congress has failed to state explicitly whether it intended the sanction to
carry a stigma.39
(1) The previous use of the sanction. Repeated legislative use of a
sanction for the express purpose of punishment creates a tendency auto-
3 2 Compare United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 293-95 (1935), and
Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922), and Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605
(1903), with Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956), and United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-52 (1943), and Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 398-405 (1938).
3 Compare Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524-25 (1958), with Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-21 (1960).
34 See Note, 34 IND. L.J. 231, 274-75 (1959).
35 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
3 6 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (Tent Draft No. 4, 1955).
37 "It can hardly be disputed that civil sanctions also, at least secondarily, serve
the purpose of prevention by deterrence." KELSEN, GENmERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
STATE 50 (1946); 1 AUsTIN, LEcruREs oN JURISpRUDENcE § 723 (1875). Penal
and regulatory sanctions also have in common the object of remedying the situation
existing after the performance of the act; the typically penal measure of imprison-
ment protects society from the offender and seeks to rehabilitate him, while a regu-
latory measure such as motor vehicle inspection eliminates the danger of operating
defective vehicles.
38A condition completely devoid of blameworthiness cannot be the subject of
punishment Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), 111 U. PA. L. REv. 122;
see HA I., GENmRA PRINcIPLEs oF CimixUN. LAw 317-18 (2d ed. 1960).
39As formulated by the Court, the tests were: "whether the sanction . . . has
historically been regarded as punishment"; "whether an alternative purpose to which
it may rationally be connected is assignable for it"; "whether it appears excessive
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned"; "whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime"; and "whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter." 372 U.S. at 168-69; see note 24 supra.
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matically to conceive of subsequent applications as punitive.40 This
tendency might explain legislative failure to specify a penal intent.
Similarly, historic use of the sanction for regulation creates an inference
that its present implementation has a regulatory intent.
(2) The severity of the sanction; the group it affects. It is fruitful
to compare the severity and scope of the sanction provided by the statute
with that which is needed to accomplish its purpose.4' A sanction more
severe than necessary supports a strong inference of punishment,42 while
a severity necessary for accomplishing the purpose suggests a regulatory
intent 4 3 If the sanction applies to substantially fewer people than the pur-
ported purpose of the act would dictate, the narrowness suggests an intent
to single out certain individuals for punishment-particularly when their
acts are more blameworthy.4
(3) The action restrained. The more blameworthy the action re-
strained, the stronger the inference that the legislature intended to punish.
A practical indicator of blameworthiness sufficient to evoke an inference
of a penal intent is that the behavior or similar behavior previously had
been made a crime.45 Likewise, previous subjection of similar behavior to
a mere regulatory sanction indicates insufficient blameworthiness for stigma.
(4) The requisite state of mind of the actor. It has been traditional
in Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence that some form of mens rea
should be attributed to an act before the stigma of punishment is placed on
the actor. If the legislature makes finding a specific mental element a
40 We cannot doubt that the present day imprisonment in a State prison or
penitentiary, with or without hard labor, is an infamous punishment. It is
not only so considered in the general opinion of the people, but it has been
recognized as such in the legislation of the States and Territories, as well
as of Congress.
Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 352 (1886) (dictum). But cf. WINFIELD,
THE PROVINCE OF THE LAv OF TORT 198 (1931).
41 The purpose referred to is the corrective aim stated in the preamble or revealed
in legislative history.
42 See, e.g., United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1938); Helwig v.
United States, 188 U.S. 605, 613 (1903). See generally Note, 34 IND. L.J. 231, 279-86
(1959). This test for determining a penal or regulatory intention is strikingly similar
to Mr. Justice Brennan's test in Trop and Mendoza-Martinez for determining whether
a sanction of expatriation is within the delegated powers of Congress. See notes
16-18 supra and accompanying text; text accompanying note 20 supra.
43 Courts upholding as regulation the sanction of permanent exclusion from an
occupation or privilege emphasize its necessity for the protection of the public. E.g.,
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (deportation of aliens) ; Hawker v. New York,
170 U.S. 189 (1898) (exclusion from the practice of medicine). In the same manner,
courts reviewing sanctions applied for the wrongful withholding or receipt of funds
from the Government indicate a regulatory purpose by emphasizing the need for
compensatory expenses when the Government is forced to bring civil suit E.g.,
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1943); Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938).
44 See, e.g., the discussion of Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), in text
accompanying notes 47-51 infra.
45 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
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prerequisite to application of the sanction, an inference of penal intent
is supportable.46
Flemming v. Nestor 47 exemplifies the operation of these tests and
the divergence of opinion which results when some of them point in each
direction. Of the eighteen possible grounds for deportation of aliens,
48
Congress chose fourteen for termination of social security benefits 49 The
fourteen involved illegal entry, conviction of a crime, and subversive ac-
tivity, while the four excluded involved less reprehensible conduct.5 0 Con-
gress failed to specify a penal or regulatory purpose, and respondent con-
tended that the statute imposed punishment without a criminal trial and was
a bill of attainder or ex post facto law. The Court held, in a five-to-four
decision, that the statute was regulatory, emphasizing that it was simply
a denial to deportees of a noncontractual government benefit in order to
keep social security payments in the country and thereby increase marginal
consumption. Mr. Justice Brennan dissented, contending that the statute
was aimed at only the very blameworthy deportees whereas the problem
of benefits leaving the country applied to all deportees. In effect, the
majority asserted that the sanction in Nestor is not one normally used for
punishment and that it is a reasonable means for accomplishing the ex-
pounded purpose; essentially, the dissent emphasized that the group was
too narrow for the purpose and that the specified conduct was very
blameworthy.51
In the expatriation cases of Mackenzie, Savorgnan, and Perez, the
severity of the sanctions appeared to be necessary to solve dual allegiance
problems, they were limited to individuals whose actions were most likely
to create dual allegiance problems, they were imposed upon unblameworthy
conduct, and they required no mental element other than voluntariness.
Hence, a regulatory intent seems plain. On the other hand, the intent of
Congress in Trop and Mendoza-Martinez, as in Nestor, is particularly
difficult to ascertain because contradictory indicia are present. The con-
siderable blameworthiness of wartime desertion and wartime draft evasion
and the requirement of a criminal purpose support an inference of penal
46 In addition to scienter, see note 39 supra, a term sometimes referring to knowl-
edge and other times to general mens rea, PERKiNS, CammAL LAW 681 (1957),
other mental elements in the order of increasing strength regarding an inference of
penal intent are voluntariness, knowledge, general criminal intent, and specific intent
47 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
4 8 Immigration and Nationality Act § 241 (a), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (1958).
49 Social Security Act § 202(n), 68 Stat 1083 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(n) (1958).
50 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 620 n.13 (1960) ; id. at 638 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
51 Congress did not express in the statute a specific state of mind requisite for
termination of benefits. However, one of the grounds of deportation specified was
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, Immigration and Nationality Act
§241(a), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1958), for which a showing of
some form of mens rea is required.
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intent . 2 However, the fact that the sanction of expatriation is not ex-
cessively severe and is reasonable in scope to promote wartime morale
supports an inference of regulatory intent.5
In United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, presently before the Su-
preme Court, the petitioner is attempting to show that the sanction of ex-
patriation for serving in the armed forces of a foreign nation is punitive by
asserting that it is unnecessarily severe and too narrow to solve the dual
allegiance problem. He argues that if this "problem had occurred to the
Congress, no doubt techniques much simpler, more effective, and less
destructive of individual rights than the imposition of statelessness could
have been suggested to demonstrate the independence of the nation from
the acts of a private individual . . . ." 54 Possible alternative techniques
are an official statement disclaiming United States concurrence in the ac-
tions, an announcement of refusal to afford diplomatic protection,55 or a
statute providing for temporary expatriation during the period of possible
embarrassment to the United States.56 Militating against this result is the
fact that in Perez the Court upheld the statute as regulatory 57 despite
equal availability of these alternative techniques. However, an argument
open in Marks which was inapplicable in Perez is that the specification of
voluntary foreign service makes the expatriation too narrow because it
does not include the embarrassing situation of a citizen calling for American
help after conscription into foreign military service.58 This argument and
the arguable alternative techniques might convince the Court under the
rationale of Mr. Justice Brennan that the expatriation was not within the
delegated powers of Congress because it was not intrinsically and peculiarly
appropriate to the solution of a foreign affairs problem.59 However, if
this theory of unconstitutionality is rejected, the Court will probably hold
that the statute is regulatory because of its close resemblance to the Perez
statute and its imposition upon the unblameworthy act of serving in the
armed forces of a nation not in conflict with the United States.50
52 The wartime desertion statute of Trop indirectly specified a mental element
because of its requirement of conviction by court martial, Immigration and Nation-
ality Act § 349(a) (8), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (8) (1958) ; the
wartime draft evasion statute of Mendoza-Martinez specified an intent to avoid the
draft Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(a) (10), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481 (a) (10) (1958).
-53 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 122 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 209-10 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
But cf. id. at 184-85; id. at 189-90, 192-93 (Brennan, J., concurring).
54 Petition for Certiorari, p. 19, United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, 375
U.S. 810 (1963).
55 Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 184-85 (1963).
6 Cf. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat 1228.
57 However, alternative techniques were not explored in Perez.
58 Petition for Certiorari, p. 18 n.4, United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy,
375 U.S. 810 (1963).
59 See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text; text accompanying note 20 s.pra.
60 Marks served with the Cuban Rebel Army against Batista from January 1958
to November 1958 and then returned to serve from January 1959 to May 1960.
During these periods, the United States Government had not yet become hostile to
the Castro government.
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Of the remaining expatriation statutes, the suggested tests create an
inference of a regulatory intent for the following restrained activities: resi-
dence of a naturalized citizen in his native country for three years 61 or in
any other country for five years, 62 an oath affirming allegiance to a foreign
government,63 foreign employment for which only nationals are eligible,6
and formal renunciation of citizenship.65 In contrast, they create an in-
ference of a penal intent for the following: treason, rebellion or insurrec-
tion,66 seditious conspiracy, 67 and violation of the Smith Act.68
ORIMINAI PROCEDURE-UxAmMous CRIMINAL VERDICTS
AND PRooF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
Two lower state courts have recently suggested that findings of crim-
inal guilt rendered by divided three-judge panels as triers of fact violate
their respective state constitutions. These courts have indicated that the
fact of division demonstrates that guilt was not established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. The decisions raise possible federal constitutional con-
siderations.'
61 Immigration and Nationality Act § 352(a) (1), 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1484(a) (1) (1958). In Schneider v. Rusk, 218 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1963), prob.
jurs. noted, 375 U.S. 893 (1963) (No. 368), a federal district court regarded the
statute as regulatory.
6
2 Immigration and Nationality Act § 352(a) (2), 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1484(a) (2) (1958).
63 Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(a) (2), 66 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481 (a) (2) (1958).
4 Inmigration and Nationality Act § 349(a) (4), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481 (a) (4) (1958).
65 Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(a) (6)-(7), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8
U.S.C. § 1481(a) (6)-(7) (1958).66 Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(a) (9), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), as amended,
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (9) (1958).
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
1 In People v. Scifo, 242 N.Y.S.2d 980 (New York City Crim. Ct 1963), defend-
ant was tried for the commission of a misdemeanor without jury in accordance with
the mandatory provisions of the New York City Criminal Court Act. The defendant
was convicted by a divided three-judge panel, permitted under the statute. N.Y.C.
CRiM. CTs. Ac §42(4). The court unanimously believed that compliance with the
reasonable doubt rule implicitly required a unanimous verdict, but, in denying de-
fendant's motion for arrest of judgment, declined to declare unconstitutional the
statutory provision which provided for nommanimous verdicts in such proceedings,
stating that such action should be left for a higher court. Id. at 986. The court
also suggested that unanimity might be required, apart from the reasonable doubt
rule, by the state constitution, even in a proceeding before a multijudge panel. The
court observed that although the state constitution had been amended to provide for
the enactment of a mandatory nonjury procedure for the trial of certain offenses,
N.Y. CONsT. art 6, § 18, there was no indication that an impairment of the traditional
requirement of unanimity was also authorized. Id. at 985.
In State v. Robbins, 189 N.E.2d 641 (Ohio Ct App. 1963), appeal granted, No.
38252, Ohio Sup. Ct, defendant, charged with arson, waived a jury and requested
trial before a three-judge panel pursuant to Ohio statutory provisions. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2945.07 (1953). Defendant's request was granted and he was found
guilty by two judges. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed and remanded, holding
1964]
770 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112.
Although there are Supreme Court dicta that due process requires
the reasonable doubt standard of proof in criminal cases,2 other dicta have
indicated that it does not require unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal
proceedings.8 A number of American jurisdictions have accordingly pro-
vided for nonunanimous verdicts in noncapital cases. The two federal
courts which have considered the relationship of nonunanimous jury ver-
dicts, to the reasonable doubt rule have taken divergent positions. In
Hibdon v. United States,5 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed a federal conviction based on a nine-to-three verdict on one count
and a ten-to-two verdict on another count. The defendant had acceded to
the trial judge's apparently coercive suggestion 0 that he accept a majority
verdict after the jury had indicated that it was unable to reach agreement.
The court held that unanimity in a jury verdict is a due process require-
that although the statute establishing the three-judge procedure provided for majority
resolution of all questions of fact and law, such procedure was subject to statutory,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.04 (1953), and constitutional requirements of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and that the failure of the panel to reach unanimity demon-
strated that guilt had not been so established.
2 See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) (dictum); Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-56 (1895) (dictum) ; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497 (3d ed.
1940). See generally id. § 2497 for a list of state codifications of the rule.
3 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (dictum); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937) (dictum) ; Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167 (1912) (dictum) ;
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (dictum). The federal constitutional pro-
visions relating to jury trial, U.S. CoNsr. art. III, §2; U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI,
guarantee to a criminal defendant in the federal courts the right to jury trial as it
existed at common law at the time the Constitution was adopted. Schick v. United
States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904). See generally Orfield, Trial by Tury in Federal
Criminal Procedure, 1962 Dura L.J. 29, 32-42, for treatment of offenses within these
provisions. Hence, a federal criminal defendant is entitled to a common-law jury
composed of twelve jurors, Maxwell v. Dow, supra at 586 (dictum); Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1899), and to a verdict in which the jurors unanimously
agree, Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288-89 (1930) (dictum) ; Maxwell v.
Dow, supra at 586 (dictum). The federal constitutional jury trial guarantee does
not apply to criminal prosecutions in state courts. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721
(1961) (dictum); Fay v. New York, supra at 288 (dictum).
4 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1902 (1947) (based upon IDAHO CoNsT. art. I, § 7)
provides for five-sixths, verdicts for the trial of misdemeanors; LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15.338 (1950) (based upon LA. CoNsT. art I, § 9) provides that whenever the
indictment does not charge a capital offense, but does charge a felony necessarily
punishable with imprisonment at hard labor, the verdict may be based on the con-
currence of nine votes; OKLA; CONST. art. II, § 19, provides that three-fourths of the
jurors may render a verdict in prosecutions of offenses less than felonies; ORE. CONST.
art. I, § 11, provides that ten members of the jury in a circuit court trial may render
a verdict unless the verdict is first degree murder. Compare TEx. CODE CmrM. PRoc.
art 688 (1951) (based on TEx. CONST. art. V, § 13) which provides that in mis-
demeanor cases in the district court, in which one or more jurors have been discharged
from serving after the cause has been submitted to them, if at least nine jurors remain,
they may render a verdict if they are in agreement. This provision has been con-
strued to require, in the absence of a lawful discharge, the unanimous agreement of
twelve- members. Renfro v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. 157, 189 S.W. 137 (1916). See
generally JOINER, CIVIL JtSTICE AND THE JURY 220 (1962). Connecticut has a statute
similar to those involved in the present cases. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-82
(1958).
5204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953).
6The court considered that under the circumstances of the case the defendants
gonsent was.not~freely given. : Id. -at 839. -
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ment that may not be waived.7  The cburt also considered unanimity
"inextricably interwoven with the required measure of proof." 8 A con-
trary view was taken in Fournier v. Gonzalez,9 in which the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit sustained a conviction obtained in accordance
with Puerto Rican statutory authority 10 by a ten-to-two vote. 1
Historically the requirements of unanimity and reasonable doubt arose
separately for different reasons. The requirement of unanimity was firmly
established by the end of the fourteenth century.1 At this time there was
no trial in the modern sense. Twelve witnesses who supposedly had knowl-
edge of the relevant facts were drawn from the neighborhood, and they
determined which of the contending parties was to prevail.1 When one
party secured twelve oaths in his favor he won. The verdict of such a body
was the conjoint testimony of twelve witnesses attesting to facts within
their knowledge prior to trial.14 As the jury was gradually transformed
into a body basing its determination exclusively on evidence introduced
at trial, the unanimity rule was carried over.15 The reasonable doubt
doctrine apparently evolved at a somewhat later date.16 The transforma-
tion of the jury from its testimonial role to that of trier of fact made it
necessary to guide the jury as to the quantum of proof required to support
7Id. at 838. The court deemed controlling the mandatory phrasing of FED. R.
CRIm. P. 31(a) which provides that "the verdict shall be unanimous." The court
noted that a proposal in one of the early drafts which would have permitted such a
waiver was rejected. See FED. R. CRam. P. 29(a) (First Preliminary Draft 1943).
The court also met the Government's contention that waiver was nevertheless per-
missible on other grounds. "The requirement of a unanimous verdict [unlike the
jury itself] is nowhere defined in the Constitution as a 'privilege to be enjoyed.' It is
the inescapable element of due process that has come down to us from earliest time."
204 F.2d at 838. See Note, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1009, 1011 n.19 (1962), as to the
apparent similarity of procedural due process under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.
8 204 F.2d at 838.
9269 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 931 (1959).
10 P.R. CoNsT. art. II, § 11, para. 2; P.R. CODE CRam. P. § 612 (1956), which
requires that the verdict be rendered by not less than nine of the twelve jurors. Since
the offense charged was alleged to have been committed prior to the establishment of
the commonwealth government, the court assumed that the defendant was entitled
to all federal constitutional rights and privileges guaranteed in Puerto Rico prior to
the promulgation of its constitution. 269 F.2d at 27. Since the federal constitutional
provisions relating to jury trial were not applicable to Puerto Rico, Balzac v. Puerto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), defendant was limited to the contention that the trial
procedure violated fifth amendment due process. 269 F.2d at 28.
"1 The court took issue with Hibdon, declaring: "[T]he second ground for the
court's decision [that the reasonable doubt rule implicitly requires a unanimous ver-
dict], if read literally, is wholly unsupported by authority, and seems to us to be
patently erroneous, at least as applied to the insular courts of Puerto Rico." Id. at 29.
12See DEvLIN, TRIAL BY JuRy 48 (1956) ; 1 HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 318 (7th ed. 1956).
13 WILLIAMs, PROOF OF GUILT 5 (2d ed. 1958).
14 FORSYTH, TRIL By JuRy 11 (Morgan ed. 1875). See JoINn, op. cit. mipra
note 4, at 39.1 5 DmiN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 48.
16 The approximate date of its appearance is not without dispute. May placed
the date as late as the closing years of the eighthteenth century. May, Some Riles
of Evidence, 10 Am. L. REv. 642, 656-57 (1876). Wignore appears to agree and
suggests that it was applied at first in various tentative forms only in capital cases.
See 9 WGmORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2497. Thayer, on the other hand, contended
that the idea, at least, had been consistently applied for centuries. THAYER, PRE-
LnmrxAN ,'RTREAnTsE ON EvmENcE AT THE Co mMON LAw 558-59 (1898).
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a verdict of guilt.Y- Ultimately it became the practice in criminal cases to
charge the jury that this burden was proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' 8
The present courts have apparently equated the mere presence of dis-
sent with the existence of "a reasonable doubt" within the meaning of that
rule. This conclusion may assume that the reasonable doubt rule is directed
to the jury as an entity rather than to the individual members qua in-
dividuals. 19 Without historical support, this assumption appears to rest
on confusion between the two distinct although related ideas connoted by
the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt." It not only is the standard for
guiding the triers of fact as to the requisite quantum of proof in criminal
cases, but also symbolizes all the safeguards that tend to insure that the
defendant's guilt is established with a high degree of certainty. The
unanimity requirement has become one of these safeguards, and appears
logically related to "reasonable doubt" only in this sense. Reasonable men
can differ as to what constitutes a reasonable doubt.2 ' The existence of
dissent does not necessarily demonstrate that either the majority was
wrong or that the dissenters were acting unreasonably: both may agree
that the defendant is probably guilty, and differ only as to whether
a doubt that they share is "reasonable." 22
17 See Waldman, Origin of the Legal Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt, 20 J. OF
THE HISTORY OF IDEAs 299, 310 (1959); cf. 9 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 12,
at 126.
Is See 9 WIGMO0E, op. cit. mspra note 2, § 2497.
19 See 21 U. CHI. L. Ray. 438, 441 (1954), which distinguishes the reasonable
doubt concept in its reference to the mental states of the individual jurors from its
tise as a group standard. The writer is critical of the latter view and suggests that
unanimity, a group concept, be justified on independent grounds. Viewing the rea-
sonable doubt rule as relating to the individual jurors and thereby separating it
from the unanimity concept avoids the necessity of holding nonunanimous verdicts
invalid per se and affords an opportunity to determine whether unanimity should be
required by due process in the context of current criminal procedure. Cf. Hearings
on S. 1392 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 24,
89, 94-95, 149, 154-60, 168, 438-39, 450, 514, 1186-87, 1596-1600 (1937), which con-
sidered the question as to matters of law. In the process of holding hearings on
President Roosevelt's proposal to increase the size of the Supreme Court, the con-
tention was made to the Committee that the Court, in handing down five-to-four
decisions invalidating legislation, was violating the rule that legislation should not be
invalidated unless unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the possi-
bility of treating the rule as being subjective and directed to the individual justices
was pointed out. Id. at 158, 1186-87, 1596-97.
21 See ibid.
22 The weakness of the assumption made by the present courts that the reasonable
doubt rule is directed to the triers as an entity is suggested by the fact that if there
is a "hung jury" the defendant may be retried although part of the panel presumably
had a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902) ;
People v. Mays, 23 Ill. 2d 520, 179 N.E.2d 654 (1962); State v. Reddick, 76 N.J.
Super. 347, 184 A.2d 652 (App. Div. 1962) ; Lavan v. State, 363 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1962). Although there might be different requirements for conviction
and acquittal, the requirement of unanimous acquittals has apparently followed the
rule for conviction as of course. If such is the case, the "hung jury" presents a
situation where the reasonable doubt rule clearly operates vis-a-vis the individual juror.
The typical jury instruction that in order to find the defendant guilty every juror
must be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not contrary since such an
instruction would be required by the unanimity rule apart from any compulsion to
comply with the reasonable doubt rule. See Billeci v. United States, 184 F. 2d 394,
403 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Egan v. United States, 287 Fed. 958, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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Whether dispensing with the unanimity requirement for conviction
would violate due process may depend on the sufficiency of the remaining
safeguards to insure that guilt will be established with a high degree of
certainty. In the jury context, the rule appears to encourage deliberation
among a jury not in immediate agreement.P The unanimity rule also
permits a single juror, rationally or irrationally, to thwart a conviction or
compel a compromise. The removal of the unanimity requirement tends to
reduce the power of the dissenting juror to persuade the jury to temper
its verdict in the defendant's favor, as when a dissenter, in the face of con-
clusive evidence of guilt, compels a compromise to a lesser included offense
or a finding of not guilty on certain counts before he will cast a guilty vote
on other counts. The jury is thereby able irrationally to temper the law in
the interest of the defendant 2-a substantial consideration suggesting that
unanimity should be required in criminal jury trials.
Whether or not a nonunanimous jury verdict of guilt is permissible
under due process, different considerations apply when trial is held before
a panel of judges. The judge does not have as much freedom as the jury
to temper the law with his own notion of "justice" to favor the defendant.2 5
The traditions, training, and experience of judges tend to sensitize them
to the great responsibility of rendering a finding of criminal guilt. They
seem, because of such institutional factors, likely to weigh the evidence with
considerably more care than a jury. Moreover, judges tend to be more
insulated from extrajudicial pressures such as the community hostility
Hibdon ignores this factor in citing Billeci to support the view that the reasonable
doubt rule implicitly requires unanimity. The court in Billeci itself appeared to dis-
tinguish between the two requirements: "[T]he prosecutor . . . must actually over-
come the presumption of innocence, all reasonable doubts as to guilt, and the nani-
nous verdict requirement." Billeci v. United States, supra at 403. (Emphasis added.)
See also Annot., 137 A.L.R. 394 (1942):
The reasonable doubt to which the . . . rule refers is . . . a reasonable
doubt in the mind of any juror, rather than a collective doubt shared by the
majority of the jury. If one juror has a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused he cannot vote for a conviction, with the result, ulnder the rule re-
quiring a unanimous verdict, that there can be no conviction so long as one
juror has a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant.
(Emphasis added.)
23 This belief asumes that the larger the number required to vote for conviction,
the greater the likelihood that there will be one member at odds with the remainder
of the panel.
24 See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932) ; Steckler v. United States,
7 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1925), upholding jury verdicts in criminal cases despite incon-
sistency as between counts. "We interpret the [inconsistent] acquittal as no more
than . . . [the jury's] assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise,
but to which they were disposed through lenity." Id. at 60. See also Bickel, Judge
and Jury-Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63 HARv. L. Rnv. 649, 651
(1950), interpreting Dunn to stand for a reaffirmation of the broad powers acquired
by juries at the common law.
The power to recast the law against the defendant does not exist, however.
25 See United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1960). The court dis-
tinguished Dunn v. United States, supra note 24, and Steckler v. United States, spra
note 24, on the ground that "the decision to ignore inconsistencies in the verdict of
a jury in a criminal case was based on special considerations relating to the nature
and function of the jury . . . ." Id. at 902.
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which may arise when the crime charged is one to which the public is par-
ticularly sensitive. 26  Furthermore, the quality of deliberation is more
likely to be higher than that of a jury-if a judge dissents the defendant
has the benefit of a more articulate spokesman to command the attention of
the other triers of fact than if a juror dissents. It seems, therefore, that
a unanimous panel is not required by due process.
EMINENT DOMAIN-EcoNomic RESTRICTIONS OF LAND UsE
CAUSED BY OFFICIAL HIGHWAY PROPOSAL HELD NOT CoMPENSABIu
Plaintiff, a real estate developer, alleged that he was unable to sell,
lease, develop, or mortgage his property for the five years that have
elapsed since the state highway commission held a public hearing and
proposed a highway which would be constructed over all such property.
In this action for damages for personal hardship and depreciation in market
value of the land,1 plaintiff alleged that a "taking" occurred under the
state constitution.2 The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the lower
court in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that
there must be a physical "taking" of at least part of the property before re-
lief can be granted.3 Bakken v. State, 382 P.2d 550 (Mont. 1963).
26 Cf. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 259, 279 n.164 (1963).
1 A claim for damages resulting from depreciation in market value, as opposed
to that for restriction of use, is properly made only when the property is actually
condemned. If the project is abandoned, it is likely that the property will regain its
value prior to the condemnation proposal. If the property is condemned, there is
some authority that the owner need be compensated only for the value at the time
of condemnation even though the property has depreciated because of the proposal
to condemn. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Lands, 47 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y.
1942); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 517-18,
57 P.2d 575, 581 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936). This rule has been termed "unjust." United
States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 635-36 (1961), quoting 1 ORGEL,
VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 105, at 447 (2d ed. 1953).
However, the Montana compensation law fixes value at time of condemnation in
accordance with the prior view. MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 93-9913 (1949). For
statements disapproving this method of valuation see 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 12.3151 (rev. 3d ed. 1962); JAHr, EMINENT DOMAIN-VALUATION AND PROCEDURE
130 (1953); Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain: Irreverence for Un-
constitutional Practice, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 319, 329-47 (1963) ; Krasnowiecki & Paul,
Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 236
(1961). Pennsylvania property owners in the path of a proposed expressway have
exhorted the Governor to initiate an eminent domain law to fix compensation at the
property value prior to the condemnation proposal. Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin,
Oct. 20, 1963, news section, p. 29, col. 5.
2"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation having been first made to or paid into court for the owner." MONT.
CON ST. art. 3, § 14.
3 In the case on which the present court relied, the plaintiff had requested a
determination that his fee had been taken. There was, moreover, no deprivation of
the beneficial use of the property. Stafford v. People, 144 Cal. App. 2d 79, 300 P2d
231 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956). For the proposition that property is not damaged pursuant
to a proposal to condemn, the present court cited a case that primarily concerned
depreciation in market value and not the inability to use the property. Chicago
Housing Authority v. Lamar, 21 111. 2d 362, 364, 172 N.E.2d 790, 792 (1961).
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This case is apparently the first in which a party has attempted to
obtain relief for restriction of property use due to a highway proposal,
absent either legal restrictions upon his right to build 4 or abandonment
of condemnation by the state after it instituted legal proceedings.5 The
constitutions of the various states in prohibiting -the uncompensated
"taking" of property do not define the limits of the prohibition. Courts,
therefore, must devise a method of balancing the advantages to the public
and the harm to the landowner who may lose completely the usefulness of
his property.
Courts holding that a physical "taldng",is a requisite to compensation 6
do not remedy hardships absent such a -taking. Although the physical
appropriation requirement is easily administered, it is an oversimplification
that disregards interferences inflicting comparable hardship on property
owners. For this reason, the majority of courts have compensated property
owners for the confiscation of intangible property rights, such as use and
possession, stemming from governmental restrictions.7
Under this majority view, courts have held that a zoning ordinance
may not cause land to lie idle for an unforeseeable period by restricting it
to a use for which it is not reasonably adapted. This restriction is con-
sidered a taking without compensation and either necessitates a variance 8
or renders the statute void.9 Similarly, an official map which legally re-
stricts the improvement of property in the bed of a proposed street has
been held a "taking" if the property may not be put to any reasonable use.' 0
4 In the cases involving a legal restriction, such as map laws and refusals of
building permits, the remedy sought is the right to build. See cases cited notes 8-9
infra; State ex rel. Sun Oil Co. v. City of Euclid, 164 Ohio St. 265, 130 N.E.2d 336
(1955) (city may not deny a permit while it decides whether or not to appropriate
the property when it has no other beneficial use) ; Kirschke v. City of Houston, 330
S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 474 (1960) (same).
5 See State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Beck, 333 Mo. 1118, 63 S.W.2d 814 (1933).
See generally 6 NICHOLS, EMINENT DomAIn § 26.45 (3d ed. 1953).
6 See, e.g., instant case; Chicago Housing Authority v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362,
172 N.E2d 790 (1961); Richert v. Board of Educ., 177 Kan. 502, 280 P.2d 596
(1955). See generally 2 NIcHOLS, EMINEX T DOMAIN § 6.2, at 249 n.54 (3d ed. 1950).
7See 11 McQuiL u N, MuNIcAL CORPORATIONS § 32.26, at 312 (3d ed. 1950);
2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DomAnm § 6.3 (3d ed. 1950); Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent
Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. Rxv. 596, 599-604 (1954).
8 Courthouts v. Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953) ; Arverne
Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). In Arverne
Bay Constr. Co., the court stated, "The only substantial difference, in such case,
between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject
to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him
of that burden." Id. at 232, 15 N.E.2d at 592.
9 Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills,
40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) ; Opgal, Inc. v. Burns, 20 Misc. 2d 803, 189 N.Y.S.2d
606 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 659, 173 N.E.2d 50, 212 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1961).
See generally 1 RATHxOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 6-4 (3d ed. 1962).
30 Roer Constr. Co. v. City of New Rochelle, 207 Misc. 46, 136 N.Y.S.2d 414
(Sup. Ct. 1954) ; In re Sansom St., 293 Pa. 483, 143 Atl. 134 (1928) ; see Kresge v.
City of New York, 194 Misc. 645, 87 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (dictum);
Vangellow v. City of Rochester, 190 Misc. 128, 71 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
State ex rel. Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957) ; 2 NICHOLS,
EMINENT DomAIN § 6.12 (3d ed. 1950). See generally Kucirek & Beuscher, Wiscon-
19641
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In Miller v. Manders,11 the court, apparently under constitutional com-
pulsion, construed a map law to require that permission be granted to build
in the mapped street when it is not possible to obtain a reasonable return
on the property as mapped. Although the hardship in the present case is
not a legal restriction upon the use of the property, but an indirect im-
pediment resulting from governmental action, its effect upon the property
owner is the same.12  However, unlike the zoning and map cases, this
indirect hardship cannot be remedied by official permission to build.
Granting of relief depends not only on the private harm, however, but
also on the benefit the public receives from a restrictive measure. Zoning
ordinances and map laws prohibit many land uses, but because of the
overriding public benefit 13 compensation is required only if all reasonable
use has been foreclosed.14 Public authorities may need many years in
advance of actual condemnation to consider traffic needs, engineering
problems, and the effect of a proposed highway upon future population
shifts.' 5 Therefore, were the only effect of the proposed route to restrict
property to a less profitable use than would otherwise be possible, the
zoning and map law cases indicate that the private hardship should be
held a noncompensable incident of property ownership in the community.
However, in the rare case when all reasonable use of given land has been
sin's Official Map Law, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 176; Waite, The Official Map and the Consti-
tution in Maine, 15 MAINE L. REv. 3 (1963) ; Note, Eminent Domain and the Planning
of Public Streets in Pennsylvania, 13 U. PITT. L. Rxv. 553 (1952) ; Note, Municipal
Street Control v. Private Property Rights, 14 SYRACUSE L. REv. 70 (1962).
112 Wis. 2d 363, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957) ; see Headley v. City of Rochester, 272
N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936) ; cf. State v. Griggs, 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960) ;
Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951). See generally
Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 1, at 184-89.
12 Brunn v. Kansas City, 216 Mo. 108, 119-20, 115 S.W. 446, 450 (1909), observed:
The filing of the petition to condemn and notice to the defendants was in
the nature of a caveat to all concerned, including the world at large, that the
city had laid its hands on the property and that the proceedings might ripen
into a sequestration of it. Beginning from that time the owner's power to
sell would be whittled away, his right to improve and develop the property
would be in abeyance.
See Kucirek & Beuscher, supra note 10, at 179, which compares the effect of the
official map with its legal restrictions and unofficial street plans and master plans
upon possible development:
If a would-be buyer learns that the land has been marked with a "green
spot" on the master plan for a park or has been "master planned" as the bed
of a proposed street or thoroughway [sic], he will be as reluctant to buy as
if the land had been officially mapped.
See also Waite, Nonresidential Urban Renewal in New York, 10 BUrFFALO L. REv.
265, 282-83 (1961).
13 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
Appeal of Kerr, 294 Pa. 246, 144 AtI. 81 (1928); Nardi v. City of Providence, 89
RI. 437, 153 A.2d 136 (1959). See generally 1 RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 9, at
6-10 to 6-20.
14 See cases cited notes 9-10 supra.
15 See generally Howard, Impact of the Federal Highway Program, in AmERICAN
Soc'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING 1957, at 35; OWEN, CITIES IN THE MOTOR
AGE (1959); Note, Pressures in the Process of Administrative Decision: A Study
of Highway Location, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 534 (1960).
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precluded, 16 these same cases dictate that such public benefit does not
justify refusal of relief.
When it can be shown that all reasonable use has been inhibited, the
most serious bar to relief is the speculative nature of the damages suffered
by the property owner, which may render it impossible to fix "just com-
pensation" for this type of temporary "taking." 17  Courts have recognized
two irreconcilable theories of compensation in condemnation proceedings.
Although the prevailing theory had been to measure the extent of the
taker's gain, the recent trend has been toward indemnification of the
owner for his loss.' 8 For the temporary taking caused by a condemnation
proposal, the former theory entails calculation of a fair rental value for the
property for the period between the proposal and condemnation.' 9 Al-
though such a value could be calculated for a factory or an apartment from
which tenants have fled because of the threat of condemnation, a vacant
development lot would not appear to have a fair rental value. At least in
the present case, therefore, the latter theory seems preferable.2 0  Although
damages based on the temporary loss of projected profits have been held
too speculative to be compensable,2 ' in some cases there may be a reasonable
'A reasonable use should give the owner a reasonable return on the property.
See State ex rel. Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957). Compare
People v. Perez, 29 Cal. Rptr. 781 (App. Dep't 1963), setting aside a conviction for
violating a zoning ordinance because, inter alia, it limited the use of land to tilling
the soil when it was best suited for development.
The risk is slight that the threat of compensation will deter early announcement
of proposals to condemn and thereby reduce the effectiveness of public hearings when
the plan is in its more flexible stages of preparation. The cost to the state may be
greater if it delays announcement of proposals since, during the delay, development
of property may take place while the property owners remain ignorant of the plan.
The state must pay for this development when it does condemn.
17 In United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 119-20 (1951), Mr. Justice
Reed stated in his concurring opinion:
The use of the temporary taking has spawned a host of difficult problems
it. . especially in the fixing of the just compensation. Market value, despite
its difficulties, provides a fairly acceptable test for just compensation when
the property is taken absolutely. . . . But in the temporary taking of oper-
ating properties . . . , market value is too uncertain a measure to have any
practical significance. The rental value for a fully functioning railroad for
an uncertain period is an unknowable quantity . . . . The most reasonable
solution is to award compensation to the owner as determined by a court
under all the circumstances of the particular case.
1 8 Kratovil & Harrison, mspra note 7, at 615, 616.
19 This views the taker's gain as the use of the property for planning purposes
for that period. For cases using rental value as a measure of compensation in tempo-
rary taking cases see 4 NicHoLs, EMINENT DomAIN § 12.5, at 340 n.6 (rev. 3d ed.
1962).
2 0 For views that the indemnification theory should be used to compensate for
loss of profits, loss of good will, and removal costs see Spies & McCoid, Recovery of
Consequential Damtages in Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L. Rzv. 437 (1962); Note,
Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67
YALE L.J. 61 (1957).
2 1 See United States v. Certain Premises Known as No. 432-434 East 49th St.,
86 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); 4 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 19, at 342; Note,
Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67
YALE L.J. 61, 71 (1957).
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basis from which to infer the extent of loss.22 If a development project
had been startedas this inference might be drawn from the return upon
property similar to that projected.2 Compensation for projected profit has
been recognized in tort and contract law,2 where the quest for absolute
certainty yields to the desirability of compensation. Indeed, when there
is no ascertainable standard upon which to measure either rental value or
loss of return, one case suggests interest at the prevailing rate on the fair
value of the property before the proposal of condemnation as the measure
of damages for a temporary "taking." 26
Allowing compensation also presents a risk that fraudulent claims will
be filed by property owners who have no bona fide plans of developing
their property. Courts should therefore require definite proof that an
intention to develop had been formulated prior to the proposal. This rigid
burden may deny relief to an owner with a genuine intention to develop,
but to require less increases the risk of fraudulent claims.
A court granting compensation in cases like the present one must
decide what public action starts the period of temporary "taking." A
newspaper article, the presence of a surveyor, or a casual statement by a
public official could all cause the necessary degree of hardship, yet practi-
cality dictates that a governmental "taking" should not be considered to
have occurred unless official governmental acts are responsible for the
hardship. The requisite governmental action should be a statement of
intent to take emanating directly from the public body whose function it
is to plan the future public project, such as the highway commission pro-
posal in the present case.
The suggested approach would not require compensation for the
owner who for personal reasons decides to sell his land and must accept a
reduced price because of the governmental announcement, although the
land's use is not impaired. This situation might occur, for example, in
the case of an owner of a residence in the path of a proposed highway who
is forced to sell his house because his employer has transferred him to
another location. It would be unreasonable to require the state to pay the
owner for such reduction in market value if the land will either return to
22 See Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. City of New York, 139 F.2d 1007, cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 747 (1943); 4 NicHOLS, op. cit. supra note 19, at 342; Kratovil
& Harrison, supra note 7, at 623; cf. 5 NicHOLS, EMINENT DoMAIn § 19.22(2) (rev.
3d ed. 1962).
23A court should require evidence such as the filing of a plat, the arrangement
for financing, or the contracting for material and labor.
24 Damages should be limited to irretrievable losses in order to preclude a later
windfall. For example, if a developer has built homes and is unable after the pro-
posal to sell them, he would be compensated for their market value upon condemnation,
or he could sell them if the project is abandoned. The loss suffered is therefore the
loss of interest upon the fair value of the homes for the period of delay after proposal.
25 See Zuromski v. Lukaszek, 67 R.I. 66, 69, 20 A.2d 685, 686 (1941); Note,
Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67
YALE L.J. 61, 71-72 & n.48 (1957).
26 See In re Condemnation of Lands for Military Camp, 250 Fed. 314 (E.D.
Ark. 1918).
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its prior value upon abandonment of the proposed governmental action or
the owner will be compensated upon condemnation.
27 Personal factors
forcing sale before either of these eventualities occurs are unrelated to the
effect of the proposal on the land, which is the basis for the suit alleging
the "taldng" of property.
28
The analysis presented applies also to restriction of property use
because of the economic effects of the determination of an area as "slum and
blight" pursuant to urban redevelopment.2 Although the hardship to the
property owner is similar to that of owners in the path of a proposed high-
way, the courts may be reluctant to place too great a burden upon redevelop-
ment since it encompasses entire communities rather than strips of prop-
erty.30  However, different redevelopment situations should be dis-
tinguished. The owners who are maintaining slum dwellings should not
be heard to complain since their property represents a negative evil which
is in part responsible for the deterioration of the community.3 1 Therefore,
only owners of vacant land who can prove that they planned to develop
before the redevelopment plan was made public and those whose past
reasonable use has been destroyed should be granted relief. It should not,
therefore, be too great a burden upon the public to compensate those few
who have suffered the requisite hardship.
The growing emphasis upon planning for open spaces, urban rede-
velopment, and integrated highway systems will make it increasingly impor-
tant that courts devise practical rules by which to compensate the property
owner who has lost all reasonable use of his land because of economic as
well as legal restrictions upon property use.
32
27 Petroli v. Baltimore, 166 Md. 431, 435, 171 At. 45, 47 (1934), stated:
But conceding that the appellants are prevented by the award from
selling their property to the best advantage, it does not follow that they have
been damaged, unless they have also been prevented from using it For if
the city eventually takes the property, it must pay the appellants what they
in effect concede is the full value thereof . . ..
28 If the property owner must move for such reasons, it is true that he has no
use for the property. However, the issue is whether the property itself is capable
of reasonable use, and it could still be used as a residence.
29 An argument that the determination of "slum and blight" restricts the ability
to improve the property and therefore is a "taking" was rejected in Wilson v. City
of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958). How-
ever, not only did the court address itself solely to the diminution in market value
and not the restriction in use, but in deciding that the diminution was not compensable,
the court relied on Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897), which held that the record-
ing of a prospective street upon an official map is not in itself a "taking." Conceding
that determination of an area as "slum and blight" is not without more a "taking,"
the same may not be true when the property cannot therefore be put to beneficial
use, an issue which the Wilson court avoided.
8o Cf. 111 U. PA. L. REv. 837, 840-41 (1963).
31 See Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basi for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L.
Rxv. 650, 664 (1958).
32 The plaintiff's claim in the present case was based upon an eminent domain
theory. If there were evidence of negligence or unjustifiable delay, a recovery in tort
would be in order. In Simpson v. Kansas, 111 Mo. 237, 20 S.W. 38 (189Z), the
plaintiff was unable to sell, improve, or rent land othervise valuable for business
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TORTS-Cnmo DENIED RECOVERY FRom FATEER FOR SUFFEmING
CAUSED BY ILLEGITIMACY
Defendant, a married man, seduced plaintiff's mother by promising
to marry her although he knew he could not; as a consequence plaintiff was
a bastard. Plaintiff, a child at the time of suit, alleged that the defendant's
willful conduct injured him in his person, property, and reputation. Char-
acterizing the cause of action as one for "wrongful life," I which if recog-
nized would be available to all those "born into the world under conditions
they might regard as adverse," 2 the court held that, despite the clear ex-
istence of injury to plaintiff, a claim of such broad compass could be recog-
nized only by the legislature. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1963).
In treating the action as one for "wrongful life," the court merged
two traditionally distinct kinds of injury-mental suffering and loss of in-
heritance rights.8 While an illegitimate's inheritance rights have generally
been a subject for statute,4 tort law governing infliction of mental harm
has been judicially developed.5 Therefore, the two kinds of injury deserved
separate analysis.
On the question of mental suffering, the court might have permitted
recovery by holding that the defendant's conduct was the legal cause of the
purposes for nine years after an ordinance for street widening. In holding that such
delay was prima facie evidence of unreasonableness, placing the burden upon the state
to prove justification for the delay, the court stated:
We think that unless defendant can show that this long delay was un-
avoidable, and that reasonable diligence was used in the prosecution of the
proceedings in the appellate court, then plaintiffs should receive compensa-
tion for their damages.
Id. at 248, 20 S.W. at 40; see Petroli v. Baltimore, 166 Md. 431, 171 Atl. 45 (1934).
See generally Annot, 92 A.L.R. 379 (1934).
.'Plaintiff advanced two other theories of recovery. He claimed to be a third-
party beneficiary to the contract of marriage made between the defendant and plain-
tiff's mother. This ground was dismissed because the action sounded in tort. He
also alleged defamation, but this was dismissed since there was no allegation of
publication.
2Instant case at 858.
3 Plaintiff alleged deprivation of his right to be a legitimate child, to have a
normal home, to have a legal father, to inherit from his father, to inherit from his
paternal ancestors, and for being stigmatized as a bastard. Id. at 851. The court
stated that mental suffering was not an element in the complaint, id. at 855, but its
description of the plaintiff's injury belies this assertion: "[L]aws cannot temper the
cruelty of those who hurl the epithet 'bastard' nor ease the bitterness in him who
hears it, knowing it to be true." Id. at 857.4 1d. at 857. With the exception of Connecticut, all American jurisdictions
adopted the English common-law doctrine of filius nullius which denied to illegitimate
children the right to inherit from their mother or father. Note, 84 U. PA. L. REV.
531 (1936). Statutes have been passed in all states to ameliorate this harsh condition,
the major change being the allowance of inheritance from an illegitimate's mother
and maternal ancestors. Id. at 531-32.
5 See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
The treatment in New York of negligently caused fright leading to physical ills is
a good example. In 1936, the New York Law Revision Commission suggested to
the legislature that it overrule Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354
(1896), and allow recovery for negligently induced fright leading to mental and
physical ills. N.Y. LAW RFvisiON CoM'eN, LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), at 47 (1936).
The legislature took no action. It was not until twenty-five years later that Mitchell
was overruled in Battalla v. State, supra.
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harm done to the plaintiff since the false promise of marriage was a willful
tort against the mother and intentional wrongdoers are liable for the natural
and probable results of their action. This indirect liability would have
represented an application of the "transferred intent" 6 principle to mental
suffering. According to this doctrine A can be liable to C for the latter's
mental distress if A intentionally caused physical harm to B, which in turn
caused C mental suffering foreseeable by A. A number of cases have
granted recovery on the ground of intentional infliction of mental suffering
to an individual who was present and whose presence was known to the
defendant at the time the latter committed a battery on a close relative of
the individual.7 Apparently only one case has held that a plaintiff could
recover even though the defendant did not know of her presence,8 and courts
uniformly have denied recovery to plaintiffs alleging mental distress who
were not present at the time of the wrongful actY
Application of transferred intent has been suggested by Dean Prosser 10
as a means of circumventing the arbitrary limitations which bar recovery
6 See PROSsER, TORTs 46-47 (2d ed. 1955) ; Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALiF.
L. REv. 40, 56-59 (1956) ; Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New
Tort, 37 MicH. L. REv. 874, 889-92 (1939).
7E.g., Rogers v. Williard, 144 Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920) ; Young v. Western
& At. R.R., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536,
155 Pac. 429 (1916) ; cf. Herzog v. Grosso, 249 P.2d 869 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952),
modified on other grounds, 41 Cal. 2d 219, 259 P.2d 429 (1953); Holland v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
8 Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924); cf. Hill v. Kimball,
76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890); Hallen, Hill v. Kimball-A Milepost in the Law,
12 TEXAs L. REv. 1 (1933). Contra, e.g., Taylor v. Vallelunga, 171 Cal. App. 2d 107,
339 P.2d 910 (Dist. Ct App. 1959); Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90, 30 N.W. 435
(1886). A recent Illinois case, Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961),
may be an additional exception. In that case the defendant told the plaintiff he was
going to kill her husband, and then killed him; but the plaintiff was not present at
the time of the murder. The court held that the threat and fulfillment of the threat,
causing mental suffering, constituted a cause of action. The opinion does not state
what the significance of the plaintiff's not being present at the killing was, nor
whether the complaint would have stood in the absence of a threat made by the
defendant to the plaintiff. The court does state, however, that severe mental dis-
turbances inflicted by "intentional actions" wholly lacking in social utility should be
redressed. Id. at 85, 174 N.E.2d at 164. This may indicate that any intentionally
wrongful act causing mental suffering, regardless of what the intention was, will
make the defendant liable for that suffering-an implementation of the "transferred
intent" approach. See 50 IL. B.J. 255 (1961); 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 535. It has
been suggested that recovery should not be allowed to a plaintiff who was not
present, for without the plaintiff's presence it would be difficult to show that the
defendant's conduct was aimed at causing the plaintiff's mental suffering. 50 IiL.
B.J. 255 (1961). This position is correct if the theory underlying recovery when
mental suffering is intentionally inflicted is that the defendant's intention is an indi-
cator of the reality of plaintiff's damages. See text accompanying note 18 infra.
Under such a view "transferred intent" should not be employed by the courts, because
the indicator the court seeks is lacking if the defendant did not in fact intend to
cause the plaintiff's mental suffering.
9 See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Massacar, 215 Mich. 511, 184 N.W. 408 (1921) ; Koontz
v. Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N.E.2d 694 (1936); see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
TORTS § 46, comment k at 28 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957); cf. Amaya v. Home Ice,
Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 299 Cal. Rptr. 33 (Sup. Ct 1963) ; Barber v. Pol-
lock, 104 N.H. 379, 187 A.2d 788 (1963); Reed v. Ford, 129 Ky. 471, 112 S.W. 600
(1908).
10 See note 6 supra.
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for mental suffering."1 Tort law has frozen, at least temporarily, around
the proposition that absent physical injury or impact, mental suffering is
legally redressable only when intentionally inflicted.1 The fear has always
been that to recognize the negligent infliction of mental suffering as an
independent tort would open the floodgate to fraudulent and trivial claims
with which the courts would be unable to cope.13 In cases in which the
mental harm was apparent the courts developed several doctrines to allow
recovery. The device most frequently used has been finding a traditionally
recognized tort, thereby maling recompense for mental harm possible, as
part of the pain and suffering element of the verdict. 4 Other doctrines
frequently employed are the "impact" rule, which allows recovery where
there is the slightest contact,15 and the "zone of danger" rule, which allows
a plaintiff who was within the area of personal physical danger to recover
although he was not touched.' 6 Mental suffering also has been held action-
able when physical harm occurred subsequent to the alleged mental suffer-
11 See generally Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 HA v. L. Rav. 1033 (1936) ; Proehl, Anguish of Mind-Damages for Mental
Suffering Under Illinois Law, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 477 (1961); Prosser, Insult and
Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 40 (1956); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental
Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MIcH. L. R-v. 874 (1939); Comment, Extension of
Recognition of Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering as Independent Tort, 33 U.
DE. LJ. 49 (1955); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100 (1959); cf. Green, "Mental Suffering"
Inflicted by Loan Sharks-No Wrong, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 471 (1953).
12 See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d
282 (1952); Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Hallo v. Lurie,
15 App. Div. 2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1961); Mitram v. Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d
106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Stafford v. Steward, 295 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956) ; Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961).
In New York, the law may not have stopped at intentional infliction. See
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), where
the court allowed recovery for negligently inflicted fright leading to mental suffer-
ing and residual physical manifestations. It is unclear what importance the residual
physical manifestations had, and whether or not recovery would have been allowed
if they were not present. Compare Lahann v. Cravotta, 228 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (Sup.
Ct. 1962) (implying necessity of residuary physical manifestations), with Baumann
v. White, 234 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (recovery allowed for negligently
inflicted mental suffering without residuary physical manifestations). It is clear that
Battalla has been very narrowly construed. See Robbins v. Castellani, 37 Misc. 2d
1046, 239 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Sup. Ct. 1962), where the court states that Battalla does
not stand for a general right of recovery for negligently inflicted mental suffering.
Prerequisite to a right of recovery is the existence of a duty owed directly to the
claimant by the defendant in the performance of an act, and the court in Robbins
indicated a very strict approach to finding a duty.
13 See, e.g., Sullivan v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1960);
Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); PROssaa, TORTS 180 (2d ed. 1955); cf.
Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (Dist Ct. App. 1952).
14 See Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MIcH.
L. Ray. 874, 880 (1939). An example of this is Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Brewer,
56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937). An insurance adjuster insulted and bullied a
sick woman in a hospital, and before leaving, scornfully threw $2.20 in coins on her
bed. The court granted recovery for her mental suffering, but based it on a technical
battery.
15 See, e.g., Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902)
(a slight blow); McCardle v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., 191 Mo. App. 263, 177
S.W. 1095 (1915) (jar or jolt) ; Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869
(1930) (inhalation of smoke).
16 See, e.g., Orlo v. Connecticut, 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941) ; Bowman v.
Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182 (1933); Frazee v. Western Dairy Prods., 182
Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935).
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ing.17 In recognizing the intentional infliction of mental suffering as an
independent tort, the courts have justified treating it differently from
negligent infliction on the ground that the chance of fraud is minimal in
the former case-that "greater proof that mental suffering occurred is found
in the defendant's conduct designed to bring it about than in physical injury
that may or may not have resulted therefrom." 18
The court properly refrained from adopting the "transferred intent"
theory because it results in arbitrariness similar to the "impact" and "zone
of danger" rules.19 Just as the latter doctrines focus on an element un-
related to the question of whether the defendant's act has caused mental
suffering, the intentional element of the tort apparently committed on plain-
tiff's mother in the present case-the fraud-was not the cause of harm to
the plaintiff.
The court was concerned with whether a tort had been committed
directly on the child. Yet, despite a finding that the plaintiff had been
injured directly by an act with all the elements of a willful tort,20 the court
denied recovery because of its inability to distinguish the present case from
other possible "wrongful life" cases. It feared that an award in the present
case might be a precedent by which any child dissatisfied with his lot in
life could sue his parent for bringing him into the world.2 ' The court's
failure to separate the present case from others in its "wrongful life" class
reflects insufficient concentration on the relationship of the plaintiff and
defendant. This lack of scrutiny may be due to the ordinary rule that when
a plaintiff claims to have been the victim of an intentional tort that causes
mental distress, the sole limitation on the scope of liability is a "natural and
probable result" criterion, rather than a requirement that there be a violation
of duty owed by the defendant to plaintiff. But, the court would have been
creating a new tort in the present case and not merely applying damages
due to an acknowledged tort. Therefore, instead of speaking in broad
terms of an action for "wrongful life," it could have articulated as the dis-
tinguishing factor in the present case the social objective of preventing the
procreation of children out of wedlock. The undesirability of illegitimacy
'7 See, e.g., Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 At. 688 (1909) ;
Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950) ; Chiuchiolo v. New England Whole-
sale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1930) ; see PROSSER, TORTS 179 (2d ed. 1955).
18 State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282,
286 (1952).
19 Prosser does not advocate a general extension of "transferred intent!' to pro-
vide recovery to a plaintiff not present at the time of defendant's act. See materials
cited in note 6 supra. However, it is not clear that the injury alleged in the present
case was not reasonably foreseeable; and this is the standard which governs Prosser's
employment of the doctrine. Ibid.
20 Instant case at 858.
21 "One might seek damages for being born of a certain color, another because of
race; one for being born with a hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate
family characteristics; one for being born into a large and destitute family, another
because a parent has an unsavory reputation." Instant case at 858.
22 This duty would also apply to the plaintiff's mother; however, the doctrine of
family immunity is probably available to her. See PRosSER, ToRTs 676 (2d ed. 1955).
But "the view of the more recent decisions and the modern legal authorities on the
subject would appear to be that the rule of non-parental liability is to apply only
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is far less controversial than the questions of judicial birth control which
are broached by other cases in the court's "wrongful life" category. While
the common law has been slow to accord legal protection to the rights and
interest of children in the family relation,2 there are some signs of a
changing judicial attitude in this analogous area. In suits for alienation
of affections, several courts have allowed a child to recover against one
who had invaded and taken from him the support and maintenance of his
parent,2 on the ground that children "are entitled . . . to the intangible
. . . elements of affection, moral support, and guidance from both of the
parents." 25 Several other courts have indicated a basic agreement with
the premise that a normal parent relationship should be a legally protected
interest, but have dismissed a child's claim for loss of consortium against
one who negligently injured his parent 2 6 because of the opportunity for
double recovery 27 and an unwillingness to extend the scope of the actor's
duty to a remote person.2 8 Loss of consortium is a derivative action based
on a harm to another, for which that other person could recover if he
sued; 2 but the present case is premised on a direct harm to the plaintiff, so
that double recovery is not a problem. Furthermore, there is no stretching
of a duty, liability being based on direct injury to plaintiff caused by de-
fendant. Since these barriers to recovery are not present, and it is desirable
to deter illegitimacy, 0 the objective of preventing procreation of children
out of wedlock should be effectuated by allowing recovery.
where the injuries occur while the parent is exercising his parental duty in the narrow
sense." Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497, 504 (E.D. Pa. 1954); see Mahnke v.
Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) ; 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 650 (1956).
23 Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REv. 177,
185-87 (1916).
24 Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp.
281 (W.D. Mich. 1949); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810
(1947); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949).25 Johnson v. Luhman, supra note 24, at 605, 71 N.E.2d at 813.
26 Meredith v. Scruggs, 244 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1957), reversing per curiam, 134
F. Supp. 868 (D. Hawaii 1955); Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 108 F. Supp. 739
(D.D.C. 1952) ; Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962). The Scruggs
case was brought under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, and in the absence of
any controlling Hawaii decisions, the district court allowed recovery. Subsequently,
the Hawaii Supreme Court held that a child had no cause of action for loss of con-
sortium against one who negligently injured his parent. Halberg v. Young, 41
Hawaii 634 (1957). The Halberg decision was based on several grounds: the action
was not one for direct injury; it was derivative and created the possibility of double
recovery. The court in Halberg distinguishes this from wrongful death actions, on
the ground that double recovery is there impossible, and intimates that those actions
in part recognize the loss occasioned a child by the disruption of a normal family
life. After the Hawaii Supreme Court clarified the substantive Hawaii law on this
point, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, solely
on the ground that it had incorrectly applied Hawaii substantive law.
27 See Halberg v. Young, supra note 26; Hoffman v. Dautel, supra note 26;
Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935).
2 8 Halberg v. Young, supra note 26; Hoffman v. Dautel, supra note 26; see 54
MICH. L. REv. 1023 (1956) ; 1 WASHBURN L.J. 610 (1962).
29 For example, a substantial part of the damages in a child's consortium action
would be for the loss of the parent's financial support, yet this element is already
covered by the parent's recovery for loss of earnings in a personal injury action.
30 See generally EASTERN STATES HEALTH EDUCATION CONFERENCE, THE FAMILY
& CONTEMPORARY SociETy (1958); Pincus, Relationships and the Growth of Per-
sonality, in HARPER & SKOLNICK, PROBLEMS OF THE FAmirY 216 (rev. ed. 1962).
